WHY THE USA IS UNLIKELY TO JOIN KYOTO OR ANY OTHER UN CLIMATE TREATY

Energy Policy. Article in Press, Corrected Proof
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The United States and international climate cooperation: International "pull" versus domestic "push"

Guri Bang a), Camilla Bretteville Froyn a), Jon Hovi a), b)  and Fredric C. Menz a), c) 

a) Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, Oslo, Norway
b) Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1097, 0317 Oslo, Norway
c) School of Business, Clarkson University, Potsdam, NY 13699, USA

Abstract

The US government is being pressured by both international and domestic influences to re-engage in international climate control. This paper considers whether the international "pull" and the domestic "push" will be strong enough to accomplish this. First, we discuss whether changes in the architecture of the current climate regime might induce the United States to re-engage at the international level. We argue that the United States is unlikely to rejoin any global climate regime that is based on the Kyoto architecture, even if Kyoto were to be "reformed". Second, we discuss whether domestic political developments might eventually cause the United States to re-engage. We conclude that US re-engagement is likely to require the emergence of a new climate regime that basically extends US regulation to other countries. However, the forging of a unified US climate policy is still in the making. Furthermore, a new regime can gain widespread participation only if the Kyoto countries accept the idea of replacing Kyoto with some alternative architecture, which seems unlikely in the near future.

1. Introduction

Russia's ratification in October 2004 enabled the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force in February 2005. This has increased public awareness of the Bush administration's repudiation of Kyoto in 2001 and efforts to re-engage the United States in an international climate regime. The Kyoto member-parties recognize that the effect of any international climate treaty will be limited without participation by the United States, which is the world's largest source of greenhouse gases (GHG), responsible for 25% of global emissions.

There is also growing interest within the United States to respond to climate change. In particular, state and local governments have enacted numerous policy measures to control GHG emissions either directly or indirectly. For instance, in August 2005, nine northeastern states announced a preliminary agreement to freeze power plant emissions (including carbon dioxide) at their current levels in 2009 and then reduce them by 10% by 2020 (New York Times, 2005b). This agreement would establish a regional, market-driven emissions trading system among the nine states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont). In addition, three western states-California, Oregon, and Washington-are exploring a regional agreement to control GHG emissions. Many states have recently adopted regulations such as renewable portfolio standards that mandate a minimum percentage of electricity production from renewable energy sources. And California, which is typically at the forefront of state efforts to control pollution from mobile and stationary sources, is considering more stringent fuel economy standards for motor vehicles to control carbon emissions.

The federal government is thus being pressured by a combination of international and domestic influences to control its GHG emissions. The question we explore in this paper is whether the combination of international "pull" and domestic "push" is likely to re-engage the United States in an international climate regime with effective global participation. We attempt to answer this question through an analysis in two steps.

First, we discuss whether changes in the architecture of the current climate regime might encourage the United States to re-engage. Three possible changes in regime design are considered: (1) introduction of binding emissions targets for developing countries, (2) replacement of Kyoto's absolute limits on GHG emissions with intensity-based emissions limits, and (3) modification of the compliance system.

Second, we discuss whether domestic political developments might eventually cause the United States to re-engage in a global climate regime. In particular, we consider whether factors such as changes in public opinion, access to more advanced technology, pressure from state and local governments, or concerns about national security and dependence on foreign energy supplies could precipitate a change in US climate policy.

We conclude that the United States is unlikely to rejoin any international climate regime that is based on the Kyoto architecture, even if Kyoto were to be "reformed". A more realistic scenario for US re-engagement is that a different international regime emerges on the basis of developments in US climate policy. However, such a regime could gain widespread participation only if the Kyoto countries accept the idea of replacing Kyoto with an alternative architecture, which seems unlikely in the near future.

3. Domestic politics

If the analysis in Section 2 is correct, the prospects are rather dim for re-engaging the United States through reform of the current climate regime. We now ask whether changes in domestic politics might be more important than international factors. We consider two potential avenues for change. The first is that developments on the domestic political scene lead to greater support for US re-engagement. The second is that initiatives taken by state and local governments develop into a unified US climate policy. As we shall see, a unified US climate policy is likely to be a prerequisite for extension to a global climate regime.

3.1. Potential triggers for change in US climate policy

Several factors might provide a domestic push for mandatory US climate policies. One factor could be that public demand for climate policies will increase as a result of perceived increases in the damages from climate change, possibly linked to occurrences such as extreme weather events.13 There is a tendency when extreme weather events occur, like the heat-wave in 1988, the recent and increasingly serious forest fires in the Southwest resulting from several consecutive years of draught, or the high frequency of hurricanes in the Mexican Gulf in 2004 and 2005, that parts of the news media link this to global warming, and hence periodically put the issue on the public agenda (Moser and Dilling, 2004).14 However, this has also often not been the case in US news coverage of such events (Ungar, 1999), and a recent survey found that so far, a majority of Americans do not link the latest hurricanes to climate change (ABC News/Washington Post, 2005). Nevertheless, should a link between extreme weather events and global warming be scientifically documented and communicated effectively to the public, public opinion might change, thus triggering a change in climate policy.15

Technological breakthroughs might also have an impact on public opinion. The federal government has consistently supported programs to promote research and development in energy technology. For example, the Bush Administration has supported development of fuel cell technology, geological storage of CO2, and new "emissions-free" technologies such as gasified burning of coal in pilot power plants (The White House, 2002). If there were breakthroughs in clean coal technology or carbon sequestration, influential coal interests would be less opposed to domestic climate policy measures.16

A third factor that potentially could increase domestic demand for GHG control policies is increased costs of dependence on foreign energy supplies. The security risk associated with dependency on oil imports from the Middle East is high, particularly in light of the volatile political situation in key oil-exporting countries (Salameh, 2003). The economic risks associated with being dependent on petroleum imports also increase as the oil price rises, whether due to supply disruptions or increasing demand from developing countries such as China and India (Cleveland and Kaufman, 2003). Greater dependency on petroleum imports could become enough of a burden to trigger increased demand for national policies to reduce the use of fossil fuels.

Finally, there is demand for federal action on climate change from US companies that have been disadvantaged by the absence of a clear-cut national policy for controlling GHG emissions.17 Firms can be disadvantaged for several reasons. First, capital investments have long time horizons, so current investment decisions may have to be changed at considerable cost if a mandatory climate policy is eventually adopted by the federal government. Second, companies with global operations in countries that have ratified Kyoto will be required to meet Kyoto-mandated emissions reductions, but cutbacks made in the United States will not count because the United States did not ratify Kyoto. The loss of flexibility in making mandated GHG emissions cutbacks could be costly. Third, companies with operations in multiple states within the United States are currently subject to different regulations pertaining to GHG emissions, again increasing the cost of conducting business. It can be expected that as climate change policies are implemented in other political jurisdictions (whether US states or other countries), companies with global operations or operations scattered throughout the United States are likely to intensify pressure on the national government for a well-defined national climate policy.

[...]

4. Assessment and conclusion

The analysis in previous sections suggests that the United States is unlikely to join any international climate regime that is based on the Kyoto architecture. This is true even if this architecture undergoes institutional reform, such as introducing binding emissions targets for developing countries, substituting intensity targets for absolute caps on emissions, or making changes in the enforcement system. Moreover, this conclusion is likely to remain valid even if the Democrats should win the 2008 elections. While many Democrats might like to see a unilaterally determined emissions target for the United States, few now favor ratification of Kyoto. A major reason for this is that the first commitment period is approaching quickly. Complying with the relatively demanding Kyoto target would therefore almost certainly require the United States to buy large amounts of emission permits, which would entail a sharp increase in the permit price. Hence, rejoining Kyoto at this late stage would be very costly and would almost certainly face fierce resistance from US energy interests (Busby and Ochs, 2004, p. 51).26

A more likely scenario for US re-engagement is that a different international regime emerges on the basis of developments within the United States. US practice when it comes to environmental treaties is generally "to act first at home, and then to build on that approach at the international level" (Purvis, 2004, p. 175). Obviously, an international regime along these lines would carry the trademark of American leadership. This is likely to give the regime a symbolic value which should strengthen the chances for ratification by the United States and by some other countries.

Perhaps more important, a regime that extends US climate policy to other countries would essentially ensure that foreign competitors face the same regulations as US companies, thereby contributing to a more level playing field for US firms. As explained by Putnam (1988; see also Evans et al., 1993), the set of international treaties that are acceptable to a particular country depends on the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among domestic constituents. If domestic constituents would be better off without regulations of an international treaty, they will seek to prevent the federal government from accepting the treaty. Pivotal constituents have a strong voice in the domestic political process and thus in determining whether a treaty obtains a sufficient majority in the ratification process (Putnam, 1988).

This means that the choice of treaty design will have important consequences for how acceptable a particular treaty is for domestic constituencies and hence for policy makers. A treaty that basically extends US policy to other countries is likely to receive congressional support simply because it improves the competitive edge of US companies by imposing more stringent regulations on foreign companies while largely prolonging existing regulations at home.

Yet, it is difficult to envision that such developments will materialize in the near future. There are at least three reasons for this. First, before entering into international negotiations, the preferences of a country's constituencies, including both government and non-government entities, must be consolidated into a reasonably unified negotiating position. At the federal level in the United States, this often requires resolution of conflicting positions taken by different executive branch departments through inter-agency bargaining. For wide-ranging issues like climate change, a dozen or more government agencies, each representing different interests, may be involved. Each agency's priorities will be influenced by special interests such as trade associations, unions, environmental groups, and other non-governmental organizations. The internal tug-of-war among agencies on a significant issue like Kyoto is very intense. The official delegation can begin negotiations with delegations from other countries only after final agreement has been reached among these parties on the national stance (Barrett, 2003; Froyn, 2006). The process of forging these concerns into a unified US climate policy is still in the making. As we have seen, there are a number of initiatives at the state and local levels. However, resistance towards a mandatory national climate policy is still substantial, and these initiatives have yet to develop into a unified policy at the national level. Agreement on a comprehensive federal climate policy would seem to be a prerequisite for international extension.

Second, while a treaty that basically extends US policy to other countries is likely to receive congressional support, it might not be acceptable to other countries. Such a treaty will be beneficial for US constituents but not necessarily for other countries, thereby making the prospects for ratification elsewhere dim. Moreover, other countries are still committed to the Kyoto process. Indeed, some observers believe that the Kyoto process is irreversible, and that re-engagement of the United States "will be achieved not through tinkering with international architecture but through the gathering of domestic political forces in the United States, aided by progress elsewhere towards implementation" (Grubb, 2004, p. 36). So long as such beliefs remain strong in the Kyoto countries, it is unlikely that they will view alternative international architectures positively. If the analysis in this paper is correct, then an open mind in the Kyoto countries about alternative international architectures would seem to be a prerequisite for a global treaty with US participation.

Finally, from the point of view of the United States, another drawback of the current regime is that it takes place within a United Nations framework. The US Congress has a history of being sceptical to the United Nations in general and to UN environmental action in particular (Purvis, 2004, p. 175). It was an exception when the United States was one of the first to sign the Framework Convention, and it is not difficult to find examples of environmental treaties (in addition to Kyoto) that are accepted internationally, but that do not have the United States as a Party (e.g., the 1992 Convention of Biological Diversity).

US scepticism towards the United Nations has increased rather than diminished during George W. Bush's presidency. It was perhaps characteristic that the US-initiated Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate was launched outside the United Nations. The Partnership includes the world's four biggest coal producers-the United States, China, India, and Australia-in addition to Japan and South Korea. It aims to keep fossil fuel power sources, but wants to make them cleaner and greener. In particular, the Partnership intends to spur knowledge exchange on technologies that can burn coal more cleanly using the latest technology to spark economic growth and cut emissions of greenhouse gases at the same time. Although the six members of the Partnership account for more than 40% of global emissions of greenhouse gases and nearly 50% of the world's population, it is unlikely that the Partnership will replace Kyoto as the dominant international climate regime. According to Robert Zoellick, US deputy secretary of state, the Partnership is intended as "a complement, not an alternative, to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Treaty". Similarly, even though some environmentalists believe that the Partnership might undermine Kyoto, few see it as a likely replacement.

In conclusion, until more experience has been gathered, a domestic US policy preference has crystallized, and the Kyoto process has been abandoned, a global climate regime with US participation is not likely to emerge. Thus, re-engagement of the Unites States is unlikely to take place for a number of years.

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doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2006.03.015     
Copyright © 2006 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved.